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Is there really “nothing you can do”? Pathways to enhanced 
flood-risk preparedness 
Abstract  
Whilst policy makers have tended to adopt an ‘information-deficit model’ to bolster levels of 
flood-risk preparedness primarily though communication strategies promoting awareness, the 
assumed causal relation between awareness and preparedness is empirically weak. As such, 
there is a growing interest amongst scholars and policy makers alike to better understand why 
at-risk individuals are underprepared. In this vein, empirical studies, typically employing 
quantitative methods, have tended to focus on exploring the extent to which flood-risk 
preparedness levels vary depending not only on socio-demographic variables, but also (and 
increasingly so) the perceptual factors that influence flood risk preparedness. This study builds 
upon and extends this body of research by offering a more solution-focused approach that seeks 
to identify how pathways to flood-risk preparedness can be opened up. Specifically, through 
application of a qualitative methodology, we seek to explore how the factors that negatively 
influence flood-risk preparedness can be addressed to foster a shift towards greater levels of 
mitigation behaviour. In doing so, we focus our analysis on an urban community in Ireland that 
is identified as ‘at risk’ of flash flooding and is currently undergoing significant flood relief 
works. In this regard, the case study offers an interesting laboratory to explore how attitudes 
towards flood-risk preparedness at the individual level are being influenced within the context 
of a flood relief scheme that is only partially constructed. In order to redress the dearth of 
theoretically informed qualitative studies in this field, we draw on Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) to help guide our analysis and make sense of our results. Our findings 
demonstrate that flood-risk preparedness can be undermined by low levels of efficacy amongst 
individuals in terms of the preparedness measures available to them and their own personal 
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capacity to implement them. We also elucidate that the ‘levee effect’ can occur before 
engineered flood defences are fully constructed as the flood relief works within our case study 
are beginning to affect people’s perception of flood risk in the case study area. We conclude 
by arguing that 1) individuals’ coping appraisals need to be enhanced through communication 
strategies and other interventions which highlight that future floods may not replicate past 
events; and 2) the concept of residual risk needs to be communicated at all stages of a flood 
relief scheme, not just upon completion.  
1.0 Introduction: From flood-risk prevention to flood-risk preparedness 
The general realignment of flood-risk management policy away from a singular emphasis on 
the prevention of floods through engineered structural flood relief works towards one that is 
more holistic and incorporates softer approaches to reduce the impacts of flooding events has 
been well documented in the literature (Lennon et al., 2014).  This shift has largely been driven 
by a growing recognition that ‘hard’ measures alone are no longer sufficient to adequately 
protect communities at risk of flooding. Not only are physical flood defences problematic due 
to their capital intensive nature (Takao et al., 2004), there is also the omnipresent concern that 
they cannot completely eliminate the threat of flooding as a degree of residual risk inevitably 
remains even within areas that are considered ‘protected’ (Ludy and Kondolf, 2014; Scolobig 
et al., 2012). Such concerns, coupled with the challenges posed by the rising frequency of 
extreme weather events associated with climate change have stimulated calls amongst a broad 
spectrum of stakeholders for the introduction of a series of ‘softer’ measures to accompany 
traditional flood-risk management approaches (O’Neill and Scott, 2011; Takao et al., 2004). 
This new way of thinking has been substantiated through the introduction of the European 
Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) triggering the emergence of new governance frameworks that 
place greater levels of responsibility for managing flood risk at the level of individual 
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households, and greater emphasis on the role of flood-risk communication, monitoring and 
warning systems, and spatial planning in the effective management of flood risk.  
Despite a plethora of ‘softer’ measures being promoted at the European level to advance a more 
holistic approach to flood-risk management, in practice the transition has been slow in many 
countries (see Dzialek et al., 2013). This has been particularly pronounced in relation to 
individual preparedness measures where there is empirical evidence to suggest that a 
significant policy-practice gap exists where many ‘at-risk’ individuals do very little (or indeed 
nothing at all) to protect themselves from risk of damage, injury or loss of life caused by 
prospective flooding events. This is despite the fact that preparedness measures have been 
shown to significantly reduce the material damages caused by a flood event, in some cases by 
up to 80% (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006).  
Whilst policy makers have tended to adopt an ‘information-deficit model’ to increase 
preparedness levels primarily though communication strategies aimed at promoting awareness,  
the assumed causal relation between awareness and preparedness is empirically weak (Bubeck 
et al., 2013; Miceli et al., 2008; Scolobig et al., 2012). As such, there is a growing interest 
amongst scholars and policy makers alike to better understand why at-risk individuals are 
underprepared. In doing so, empirical studies have generally focused on exploring the extent 
to which flood-risk preparedness levels vary depending not only on socio-demographic 
variables, but also (and increasingly so) the perceptual factors that influence flood-risk 
preparedness (Birkholz et al., 2014). This study builds upon and extends this body of research 
by offering a more solution-focused approach that seeks to identify how pathways to flood-risk 
preparedness1 can be opened up among communities/householders who are at-risk of flooding. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper we use the term ‘preparedness’ to describe a broad range of non-structural flood-
risk reduction measures. In doing so, we do not follow the convention of Lindell and Perry (2004) in distinguishing 
between adaptive measures taken at various stages of the hazard cycle (i.e. long before, shortly before, and after 
the event). Instead, we follow the convention of Raaijmakers et al. (2008), who consider preparedness as both the 
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Specifically, we seek to explore how the factors that negatively influence flood-risk 
preparedness can be addressed to foster a shift towards greater levels of mitigation behaviour. 
In doing so, we focus our analysis on an urban community in Ireland that is identified as ‘at 
risk’ of flash fluvial-flooding and where a structural flood relief scheme is currently under 
construction. In this regard, the case study offers an interesting laboratory to explore how 
attitudes towards flood-risk preparedness at the individual level are being influenced within the 
context of a flood relief scheme which has been only partially constructed. By employing 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) as a theoretical framework to help guide analysis and 
make sense of our results2, this paper helps redress a general dearth of theoretically informed 
studies within this sphere of research (Kellens et al., 2013). Whereas PMT has been more 
widely employed over recent years in flood preparedness related studies (Bubeck et al. 2013; 
de Boer et al. 2015; Franklin et al. 2014; Koerth et al. 2013a, 2013b; Poussin et al. 2014; 
Reynaud et al. 2013), there is little evidence of the application of qualitative methods in this 
research area, which we shall employ.  This research also contributes to the emerging socio-
hydrology literature concerned with understanding the complex interactions and feedback 
mechanisms “between water and human systems” that arise in areas at risk of flooding and are 
informed by a range of hydrological and social processes (Di Baldassarre et al., 2013: 3235). 
1.1 Factors influencing flood-risk preparedness 
Whereas preparedness has been conceptualised in terms of an administrative emergency 
plan/strategy (Perry and Lindell 2003) or the city system (Grothmann and Reusswig 2006), it 
is the individual level with which this research is concerned.  In seeking to understand what 
                                                 
capability of coping with a flood throughout the inundation period, and post-flood recovery capability and 
strategies. 
2 We do not employ a theory verifiaction approach to test the validy of PMT. We merely draw on this theoretical 
framework to help analyse our data as it offered the greatest explanatory power in terms of interpreting our results. 
In doing so,we employ a similar approach to Devitt et al. (2016) who employ the Health Belief Model to 
understand their findings in relation to the perceived drivers and barriers to the effective management of domestic 
wastewater treatment systems. 
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accounts for flood-risk preparedness at the level of the individual, numerous studies suggest 
that preparedness for a natural disaster is linked with a range of socio-economic and 
demographic variables (for an overview, see: Bubeck et al., 2012; Kellens et al., 2013; Miceli 
et al., 2008).  However, there is a growing body of scholarship which indicates that subjective 
or perceptual factors are far better predictors of why some people prepare whilst others do not 
(Bubeck et al., 2012; 2013; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). While scientific measures of risk 
involve objectively calculating the probability of events and the magnitude of the negative 
consequences, understanding how people perceive, and respond to, flood risk is far more 
complex (see Aven, 2012). Specifically, it is increasingly recognised that consideration must 
be given to how people think and feel about a risk (Slovic et al. 2004), otherwise known as the 
cognitive and affective components of risk perception. Reflecting this complexity, a broad 
range of perceptual factors have been identified as influencing levels of flood preparedness at 
the individual level.    
Awareness   
Food risk awareness can be regarded as the core cognitive element of risk perception and is 
defined by Raaijmakers et al. (2008: 311) as the “knowledge or consciousness of the flood risk 
that an individual or a group is exposed to”. The general hypothesis is that people will be more 
prepared if they are aware of, and understand the dangers associated with, a prospective 
flooding event, thereby lowering the impacts of an inundation (Botzen et al., 2009; Burningham 
et al., 2008; Dzialek et al., 2013). However, flood-risk awareness can be rather problematic, 
not least because of the considerable divergence that can exist between subjective and objective 
measures of risk amongst individuals, otherwise known as ‘perception bias’ (Daniel et al., 
2009). More specifically, individuals can have different awareness levels ranging from expert 
awareness to complete ignorance of risk (Raaijmakers et al., 2008). Furthermore, several 
studies have undermined the assumed causal relationship between flood-risk awareness and 
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preparedness stressing that attitudes are not always great predictors of how people behave3  
(Blake, 1999; Bubeck et al., 2012; Eriksen, and Gill, 2010; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; 
Miceli et al. 2008; Scolobig et al., 2012).  
Emotions 
The disjoint between awareness and preparedness has led to a growing interest amongst 
researchers into the affective component of risk perception which relates to the emotional 
feelings of individuals towards a flood hazard (e.g. fear, worry, dread) (Miceli et al, 2008; 
Raaijmakers et al., 2008; Takao et al., 2004; Terpstra, 2011). Such ideas are inherently linked 
to the ‘affect heuristic’ (Slovic et al., 2004) or the ‘risk-as-feelings hypotheses’ which predicts 
that “positive and negative emotions attached to natural hazard experiences should influence 
risk perceptions and, possibly, preparedness behaviour” (Terpstra, 2011: 1660). Within this 
overall context, the feeling of worry has been identified as being of particular importance in 
determining the preference for risk reduction by scholars such as Raaijmakers et al. (2008). 
Specifically, they argue that if levels of worry are high, there will be a greater demand for risk 
reduction thus stimulating higher levels of preparedness and vice versa. This general line of 
argument has been supported empirically in several studies (see Harries, 2008; Miceli et al., 
2008; Zaleskiewicz et al., 2002). Other authors have demonstrated similar affects in relation to 
other emotions such as fear (Takao et al., 2004), place attachment (Mishra et al. 2010) and an 
emotional desire to feel secure in one’s home (Harries, 2008). 
Flood Experience 
Many empirical enquires have highlighted that the negative emotions emanating from previous 
flooding events helps explain why flood victims take more precautionary actions against future 
                                                 
3 Such evidence undermines the direction of official policy in places like the UK and Ireland which have become 
increasingly focused on raising awareness in a bid to improve levels of preparedness and more appropriate 
responses to future flooding events (see OPW, 2004). 
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floods than non-victims (Burn, 1999; Norris et al., 2009; Siegrist and Gutscher, 2006;). In this 
regard, it is assumed that those who have been negatively affected by floods in the past are 
keen to ensure that they are better prepared in terms of protecting themselves and their property 
should another flooding event arise in the future. While past experiences can positively 
influence preparedness at both the individual and community level, this relationship can be 
complicated by a range of other factors such as the recency of the event (Burn, 1999) and the 
level of damages incurred (Miceli et al., 2008; Takao et al., 2004).  Moreover, people may find 
themselves underprepared by anticipating floods of the same magnitude as a previous event, 
thereby neglecting the possibility that the risks to property and individuals associated with a 
future flood might be much greater (Kates, 1962; Hopkins and Warburton, 2014). Past 
experiences might also adversely influence levels of preparedness by creating feelings of 
helplessness and hopelessness, particularly if the mitigation measures employed previously 
were overwhelmed and failed to provide the desired level of flood protection (Siegrist and 
Gutscher, 2008). In such instances, individuals can overlook the possibility that future floods 
may in fact be smaller in magnitude and thus easier to manage than before. Such issues are 
closely related to issues of trust in the mitigation measures available (i.e. response efficacy), as 
well as one’s belief in their ability to adopt them (i.e. self-efficacy) (see section 1.2).     
Trust 
Trust has also become an increasingly prominent variable used to explore how people perceive, 
and respond to, flood risk. The term ‘trust’ is somewhat broad, but within the field of flood-
risk management it is generally used to refer to: 1) Institutional trust (i.e. the government’s 
ability to cope with flood); or 2) Trust in specific mitigation measures (i.e. flood defences) 
(Kellens et al., 2013).  With regards the former, Lin et al. (2006) show that higher levels of 
trust amongst individuals in terms of crisis management and flood warning systems increased 
the take up of mitigation intentions (e.g. purchasing insurance, information seeking etc.). 
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However, it is the latter type of trust referred to above which has tended to be the focus of 
empirical enquires, with various studies exploring how faith in mitigation measures, 
particularly engineered flood defences, might influence levels of preparedness (see Hung, 2009; 
Terpstra, 2011). The general hypothesis is that high levels of trust in public defences decreases 
perceptions of flood-risk (especially perceived probability), which in turn keeps citizens from 
preparing for potential flood disasters (Terpstra et al., 2009; Viglione et al., 2014). Evidence 
supporting this overall relationship can be found in studies carried out by Dzialek et al. (2013), 
Grothmann and Ruesswig (2006), Hung (2009), Scolobig et al. (2012), and Terpstra (2011), . 
The obvious problem with this of course is that there is always an element of residual risk4 
given that carefully engineered flood defences “cannot prevent damage if a flood exceeds the 
capacity of a structure designed to prevent it” (Takao et al., 2004: 777). With this in mind, it is 
clear that at risk populations may have excess confidence in the structural measures available 
which reduces perceptions of risk and fosters an unwarranted resistance to the adoption of 
preparedness measures at the individual level – a  phenomenon commonly known as the ‘levee 
effect’ (Bradford et al., 2012; Ludy and Kondolf, 2014; Scolobig et al., 2012;).  
Attitudes towards controlling risk 
A number of studies have begun to explore the notion that an individual’s level of preparedness 
may vary based on whether or not a person is of the opinion that the risk in question can be 
controlled.  The general assumption is that feelings of control over risk leads to a higher 
willingness to engage in mitigating behaviour. This idea has been supported by Norris et al., 
(1999:45) who argue that control is “a central cognitive mechanism explaining why many 
victims change their behaviour” and “a lack of perceived control is equally implicated as an 
explanation for why many victims do not”. In this regard, it has been highlighted that some 
                                                 
4 Residual risk (or net risk) is the term generally used to describe the risk that remains after controls are put in 
place. 
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individuals or communities share an opinion that floods are something which simply cannot be 
controlled and little can be done to decrease the losses incurred regardless of the types of 
measure proposed (Dzialek et al., 2013). This type of attitude has been found to be more 
common in smaller rural communities which tend to be more in touch with nature and possess 
“more lay knowledge about natural processes” in comparison to urban communities who have 
a tendency to place more faith in technological solutions (White, 1974 as cited in Ibid: 2560). 
The importance of context in this regard is further elaborated on by Dzialek et al. (2013) who 
argue that people who are at risk of flash flooding may be particularly prone to adopting a 
fatalistic approach in terms of their ability (or lack thereof) to prepare for a flooding event 
given the speed at which an inundation occurs (see also Scolobig et al., 2012). 
Responsibility  
The concept of responsibility is another variable which has been used to explain the disjoint 
between how people perceive and ultimately respond to flood risk. Theoretically it is generally 
assumed that people are more likely to adopt mitigation behaviour if they feel it is their 
responsibility to do so (Lara et al., 2010). While recent policy shifts have meant that aspects of 
flood-risk management are increasingly considered the responsibility of individual households, 
a number of empirical enquiries reveal that such ideas are often at odds with the attitudes of 
citizens themselves. In particular, it is evident that many individuals still consider the state as 
being ultimately responsible in terms of preparing for flood events (see Botzen et al., 2009; 
Dzialek et al., 2013). There thus appears to be a significant disjoint between policy and practice, 
as individuals continue to perceive flood-risk management as a state responsibility while the 
state (in light of new policy approaches) sees risk management responsibilities being shared. 
Indeed Grothmann and Reusswig (2006) find reliance on public flood protection reduces 
household motivation to take precautionary action, with high levels of public confidence in 
institutions responsible for flood management found to reduce the likelihood of households 
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taking preparedness actions (Reynaud et al., 2013). The reluctance of individuals to accept 
responsibility for flood-risk management may reflect a desire to exonerate themselves for 
taking individual actions (Terpstra, 2011). An alternative explanation may reside in the fact 
that national agencies continue “operating in accordance with old habits that are typical of an 
interventionist approach” (Dzialek et al., 2013: 2563) despite rhetoric that a change in direction 
in terms of how we think about floods is needed.  
Social Capital  
A relatively small body of work also identifies a relationship between social capacity and flood 
preparedness (Babcicky and Seebauer, 2016; Dittrich et al. 2016; Lara et al., 2010; Scolobig et 
al., 2012; Tran et al., 2008;Dzialek et al., 2013). For instance, the work of Dzialek et al (2013) 
demonstrates how bonding social capital5 enables “the strengthening of memories about past 
natural disasters and the exchange of information about possible future risks and mitigation 
behaviour” (Ibid: 2556). The study also highlights the importance of bridging social capital in 
terms of helping to transfer knowledge to more marginalised groups (e.g., new inhabitants etc.).  
In a similar vein, Scolobig et al. (2012) found that higher levels of community embedding were 
linked with higher evaluations of preparedness at the community level, although Babcicky and 
Seebauer (2016) find that expectation of social support ‘downplays risk’. However, in general, 
such studies elucidate the importance of strengthening both formal and informal community 
networks in terms of promoting enhance flood preparedness.  
1.2 Protection Motivation Theory  
The foregoing section illustrates that understanding what motivates people to protect 
themselves and their property against a flooding event is far more complex than one might 
                                                 
5 Bonding social capital relates to strong ties among family members, friends and neighbours and are typical of 
more stable and deep rooted communities, whereas bridging social capital is more common in newer less 
established neighbourhoods 
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assume. Indeed, various models have been developed to understand these complexities in 
greater detail.  One such framework is Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), a theoretical 
model originally developed in the 1970’s to help understand behaviour in response to certain 
health risks. This model has since been employed within the realm of environmental hazards 
in general (Martin et al., 2007; Neuwirth et al., 2000), and in the context of flood-risk 
preparedness in particular (Bubeck et al., 2012; 2013; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006;). As a 
model, it attempts to reflect the cognitive processes leading to a protection motivation in 
response to a threat. PMT’s core feature is the differentiation it makes between two perceptual 
processes, threat appraisal and coping appraisal. The former takes into account how an 
individual evaluates a certain risk and is strongly related to common measures of risk 
perception, namely perceived probability and perceived consequences. Perceived probability 
refers to an individual’s “expectation of being exposed to a threat” such as a flooding event 
(e.g. high risk of being flooded within the next 10 years). Perceived consequences on the other 
hand refers to an individual’s estimate of the damages caused if the threat were to occur (e.g. 
damage to property and valuables, loss of life etc.) (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006: 104)6. 
However, it is the notion of ‘coping appraisal’ which really distinguishes PMT from other 
models as this component seeks to capture not only how people think about the benefits of 
taking an action, but also their own competence to carry it out (Bubeck et al., 2012). In order 
to determine an individual’s coping appraisal, three key variables are explored: 1) response 
efficacy; 2) self-efficacy and 3) response costs. Response efficacy is the belief that the response 
is effective in terms of reducing risk (i.e. level of faith in response). This variable is almost 
identical to that of trust in physical flood defences already discussed, but instead it relates to a 
series of non-structural mitigation measures that can be adopted at the individual level (e.g. 
                                                 
6 In addition to these two core variables, Grothmann and Reusswig (2006) highlight the existence of a third 
component, namely fear. This is considered to play a more “indirect role in threat appraisal by a ﬀecting the 
estimate of the severity of the danger” (Ibid: 105). 
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sand bags, building alterations, flood-proof kits, evacuation plans etc.). Self-efficacy7 relates 
to the confidence of an individual in terms of their own capacity to carry out or implement a 
mitigation measure. Reponses costs seeks to capture the estimated costs involved in adopting 
a preparedness measure, which can include things like time and effort as well as monetary 
expenses8 (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). The general assumption underpinning this model 
is that people who have a high perception of risk (i.e. threat appraisal) will adopt a protective 
response, but only if their coping appraisal is also high   (see Figure 1). By way of contrast, 
people who may have a high perception of risk, but a low coping appraisal will tend to adopt 
non-protective responses (e.g. denial, fatalism, wishful thinking etc.) (Ibid). According to this 
model, these cognitive processes are informed by a variety of variables including verbal 
persuasion, observational learning, personality variables and prior experience.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A schematic overview of protection motivation theory  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Weinstein (1993 in Kellens 2013: 39)  argues that that self-efficacy is difficult to operationalise as measures of 
self-efficacy often question “the problems individuals expect to encounter in adopting the precaution or doubts 
about the ability to change current patterns of behaviour” which reference more to the barriers or costs to do 
something rather than one’s self-efficacy”- 
8 Although not adopting a PMT framework, Dzialek et al. (2013) demonstrate that economic costs can be a barrier 
to implementing preparedness measures, particularly purchasing insurance.   
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This overall framework has been explored empirically and has been shown to be highly 
effective in terms of explaining why people prepare (or not) for a prospective flooding event 
(Bubeck et al., 2012; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). More specifically, several authors have 
highlighted the robustness of ‘coping appraisal’ in particular as an explanatory factor in this 
regard (Bubeck et al., 2013; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006; Poussin et al., 2014; Terpstra, 
2011). For instance, Bubeck et al.’s review (2012) argues that the coping appraisal component 
has a greater predictive validity that the threat/risk perception component. Grothmann and 
Reusswig (2006: 107) also outline that understanding whether or not people decide to protect 
themselves against a flood is not determined by an individual’s perception of risk, it is “instead 
decided on the basis of the coping appraisal” as self-efficacy and response efficacy were 
correlated with non-protective responses in their study9. Similar findings are reported by 
Poussin et al. (2014) who found that threat appraisals have a small effect on preparedness, 
while coping appraisals have a more important influence amongst the French case studies they 
surveyed.  Bubeck et al.’s (2013) empirical work also supports this contention with self-
efficacy emerging as a significant predictor of whether individuals adopt structural building 
measures. These studies highlight the robustness of coping appraisal as a key variable 
accounting for flood-risk protection.  
                                                 
9 See Figure 2 of Grothmann and Reusswig (2006: 105) for direction of influence of the variables in the cognitive 
mediating process. 
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2.0 Methodology  
2.1 Case study  
The research takes a case study approach by focusing on the coastal and riverside town of Bray, 
Co. Wicklow, which is located in the east of Ireland (see Figure 2). The town has a history of 
flooding with four major fluvial flood events taking place since the turn of the 20th century 
(1905, 1931, 1965 and 1986) and with a series of flood warnings issued in 2008 and 2011.  A 
‘dry run’ community flood drill was also undertaken in 2009 to increase community 
preparedness.  Importantly, the most recent large-scale flooding event occurred in 1986 
whereby large areas of the town were extensively flooded by the River Dargle during Hurricane 
Charlie (having an estimated return period of 100 years) (Bray Town Council et al., 2007). 
Based on the geographical and hydrological features at play within this river catchment the 
River Dargle is particularly prone to flash flooding. In light of the high level of risk that is 
posed to both people and personal property within the River Dargle’s fluvial flood zone in Bray, 
Bray Town Council and the Office of Public Works, the state agency responsible for flood-risk 
management in Ireland, undertook a design process10 including public consultation initiatives 
for the River Dargle Flood Relief Scheme, with funding approval for its construction first 
announced in 2011. The scheme commenced construction in 2012 and upon its completion is 
designed to provide protection against a 1-in-100 year fluvial flood and 1-in-200 year tidal 
flood, and so comprises a variety of measures including: the widening of the river channel; 
dredging; river walls; culvert etc. The works have been subject to significant delays but are 
expected to finish in late 2016 with an estimated total cost now in the region of €40 million. 
  
 
Figure 2: Case Study Area 
                                                 
10 The design and consultation process commenced in 2006. 
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 Figure 3: Flood Relief Works in Bray 
 
(Image source: adapted from www.bray.ie) 
 
2.2 Study Design  
Culvert 
Flood Wall  Channel widening  
17 
 
Research ethical approval was granted by the University College Dublin Human Research 
Ethics Committee. Qualitative research methods were used to explore perceptions of flood risk 
among a small cohort of householders living inside the identified flood zone in Bray (for flood 
zone extent details see Figure 2).  A qualitative research design was favoured to generate more 
detailed insights into the barriers preventing individuals from effectively preparing for flood 
risk thereby redressing the dominance of quantitative survey-based research designs to date. In 
doing so, a series of focus groups were conducted with residents at various locations within the 
flood zone. Used across a variety of disciplines, focus groups can be understood as ‘somewhere 
between a meeting and a conversation’ (Agar and MacDonald, 1995: 80), comprising a group 
of participants discussing a specific topic. Focus groups were favoured as they allow 
participants to ‘explore and clarify their views in ways that would be less easily accessible in 
a one to one interview’ (Kitzinger, 1995: 299), and they can often yield intangible or hidden 
data (e.g. non-verbal or physical expressions) (Wilkinson, 1998; Sim, 1998). In addition, focus 
groups can allow for the maximisation of data collection, particularly if time is limited 
(Acocella, 2012), and when used in exploratory research, can help inform more structured 
approaches to data collection (Wilkinson, 1998; Sim, 1998).  
2.3 Participant recruitment  
Six locations within the 1-in-100 year modelled flood zone (see Figure 2) with varying degrees 
of access, and physical and visual positioning relative to the river and the flood defence works 
(see Table 1) were selected by the research team.  All of these locations had been previously 
surveyed as part of a quantitative study within a wider research project (see Brennan et al., 
2016; O’Neill et al., 2015; O’Neill et al., 2016), however the sample locations of this qualitative 
study were narrowed to six more discrete locations within the flood zone, each comprising a 
cluster of adjoining residential roads or an individual residential estate.  Just under 200 
individual properties received an invitation, comprising 30% of all residential properties that 
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are located within the flood zone, but located differentially across the study area.  It was 
intended that each individual focus group would be drawn exclusively from one of these six 
locations. A tailored letter of information (available from the authors) was hand delivered 
directly by the research team to individual houses within each location one week prior to the 
planned focus group. The letter outlined the following: focus group date and location; study 
objectives; what participation involved; how the data generated was being used; the protection 
of participant privacy; the benefits and risks involved as a result of participation; and 
information on the dissemination of results; contact information and background information 
on the research team. In order to maximise participation rates, householders were offered 
compensation for their participation (i.e. a monetary voucher to the value of €10), and the data 
collection sessions were conducted at a community facility (i.e. a meeting room adjoining a 
local not-for-profit cafe), within walking distance of each specific location, and at an 
appropriate time of day (between 7pm- 9pm.).  Two days prior to each planned focus group, 
reminder letters were circulated to householders. The research team liaised closely with 
individuals who contacted the team to express their interest in participating in the research. 
Focus Groups were conducted between July and August 2015. 
Although six focus groups were proposed, there were varying degrees of success regarding 
levels of participation. Small focus groups comprising between four to six participants are 
considered sufficient, although larger groups of eight to twelve are preferred (Krueger, 2000; 
Sim, 1998). Despite following good practice techniques in terms of focus group recruitment 
(Sim, 1998), in some instances the number of participants failed to meet the lower 
recommended threshold number of four (see Table 1). This minimum number was achieved in 
the case of Focus Group 2 and Focus Group 3. In the case of Focus Group 1 and Focus Group 
5, the group dynamic attribute was achieved despite the lower number of participants. The 
planned Focus Group 6 turned into a face-to-face interview with one participant. One location 
(FG4) yielded no participants despite extensive efforts made in terms of recruitment. This may 
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be reflective of the occupancy profile of the location (i.e. rented accommodation versus 
ownership), and a lack of direct experience of flooding, such as that caused by Hurricane 
Charlie in 1986, given that it is a relatively recent area of development. In total, 18 individuals 
participated in the study. As noted by Brod et al., (2009) and O’Reilly and Parker (2012), data 
collection should continue until no new insights are generated (i.e. data saturation). There was 
a high degree of consensus in terms of the themes that emerged from the focus groups and face-
to-face interview suggesting that saturation was achieved, albeit limited to those who had prior 
direct or indirect experience of flooding.  A breakdown of the focus groups in terms of 
participant numbers, location within the flood zone and their experience of flooding are 
documented in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Breakdown of focus groups in terms of participant numbers, location within the flood zone and experience of flooding.   
Focus 
Group 
 
No. of 
Participants
* 
No. 
Dwellings 
Targeted** 
Proximity of participants’ 
dwellings to the river 
Participants’ experience and potentially 
modifying variables 
Focus 
Group 1 
(FG1) 
3 20 • Not directly adjacent to 
the river. 
• No direct view of the 
river. 
• Direct and indirect experience of flooding. 
• Experience of flood warning. 
Focus 
Group 2 
(FG2) 
5 35 • Direct view and physical 
access to the river. 
• Direct and indirect experience of flooding. 
• Experience of flood warning. 
Focus 
Group 3 
(FG3) 
7 40 • Physical access to the 
river (via Public Park).  
• Limited view of the river. 
• Direct and indirect experience of flooding and 
flood warning. 
Focus 
Group 
4*** 
(FG4) 
0 40 • Adjacent to the river, with 
limited view and physical 
access. 
 
• Development built subsequent to Hurricane 
Charlie in 1986.  
• To date, this development has not been flooded. 
Focus 
Group 5 
(FG5) 
2 30 • Limited view and physical 
access to the river. 
• Direct experience of flooding. 
Focus 
Group 6 
(FG6) 
1 30 • Physical access to the 
river (via Public Park). 
• Limited view. 
• No direct experience of flooding but experience 
of flood warnings. 
* Focus groups should ideally be between 4-8 participants.   
** Number of dwellings targeted reflects differences in terms of neighbourhood size. 
*** As focus group 4 yielded no participants this row refers to a development, not individuals.  
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2.4 Data collection 1 
A review of existing literature on risk perception and preparedness helped inform the 2 
development of a topic guide for the purpose of data collection. The topic guide covered a 3 
number of thematic areas, which sought to elicit the perceptions of participants in relation to: 4 
flood risk; previous flood experiences, levels of preparedness; types of preparedness measures 5 
adopted, issues of responsibility and trust, as well as attitudes towards the flood relief works.  6 
On arrival at the focus group location, participants were greeted by the researchers attending 7 
the session and offered some light refreshments so as to generate a relaxed setting.  The meeting 8 
room where the sessions were conducted was spacious and well-lit, with the session undertaken 9 
around a large roundtable facilitating face-to-face group interaction amongst participants.  Prior 10 
to commencing the session, the moderator discussed some basic ‘ground rules’ and participants 11 
were assured that this was a learning environment for the research team (Sim, 1998) and they 12 
were all encouraged to share their views and experiences ‘without repercussion’, in line with 13 
the approach of McLafferty (2004).   14 
Data collection sessions typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Discussions were 15 
moderated by a member of the research team and were attended by a second team member who 16 
observed the session. All discussions were recorded digitally with the verbal consent of 17 
participants. Although a snowball sampling technique was not employed, in a number of focus 18 
groups, householders knew each other outside of the study setting. This is not surprising given 19 
that all properties were co-located across the locations (i.e. road/estate) targeted for participant 20 
recruitment.  According to Kitzinger (1999), such social familiarity may have a number of 21 
implications. While on one level, this may have added to the group dynamic; on the other, 22 
social familiarity with other participants may result in self-censorship whereby individuals feel 23 
unable or uncomfortable sharing a particular viewpoint or experience for fear of social isolation. 24 
Householders may also express a response bias, sharing opinions and viewpoints that they 25 
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regard as being socially desirable and fitting with the views of other participants.  In order to 26 
help redress such issues, the moderator was cognisant of the importance of seeking verification 27 
and validation from householder participants throughout the data collection phase, and as a 28 
result, often repeated viewpoints back to the participant group to see if they were shared by all 29 
members of the group. This process helps ensure interpretive validity and research rigor (Morse 30 
et al., 2002). Whereas Farnsworth and Boon (2010) note non-verbal dynamics and interaction 31 
can run parallel to the primary information gathering process, all the sessions maintained a 32 
cordial and relaxed atmosphere throughout.  Nevertheless, for example, when recalling flood 33 
memories, this generated emotions of upset for some participants at times.  Whilst these 34 
participants were offered the opportunity to take a break11, they all felt comfortable in the focus 35 
group atmosphere to continue to share their experiences.  In line with Nyamathi and Shuler 36 
(1990: 1286) the moderator sought to apply ‘mild, unobtrusive control’ so as to maximise the 37 
group dynamic between participants on the topic of interest and to avoid domination of 38 
discussion.  Where, on occasion, consensus on an issue may have been assumed, the use of 39 
member checking through careful probing by the moderator brought forward dissent on some 40 
issues suggesting the existence of initial self-censorship amongst some participants, but also a 41 
level of trust in the moderator to overcome this.  Post-session debriefings12 and research team 42 
reflection did not suggest any undue influence on the part of the moderator in terms of biasing 43 
participant responses or excessively controlling group discussion. 44 
While due to ethical considerations, householders were not asked to provide any biographical 45 
information (such as age, income and education profile, etc.), the participants were generally 46 
                                                 
11 The option to opt out of the session at any time was also put forward in the ground rules. 
12 A post-session debriefing of the research team after each focus group discussed how the session was conducted 
by the moderator, areas of agreement or dissent, important social dynamics that should be recorded, and also 
reflection about any possible modifications to be applied to subsequent sessions (Kidd and Parshall, 2000). 
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older and had either direct or indirect experience of Hurricane Charlie, and a relatively even 47 
gender balance was achieved.  48 
2.5 Analysis  49 
Audio recordings were imported into an on-line transcription tool for transcribing by the 50 
researcher. This tool provided the option of slowing down the audio-file if required, to allow 51 
ease of transcription, while also allowing the researcher to develop an initial familiarisation 52 
with the data (see Braun and Clarke, 2006). In order to protect anonymity, any identifiable 53 
information (such as names and location specifics) were removed from the transcripts. 54 
Individual lines of transcript formed the text unit for the purpose of analysis; however, the 55 
transcripts were formatted in such a way so that each individual spoken passage comprises a 56 
section. Full transcripts were subsequently imported into NVIVO-8 (QSR-NUD*IST 57 
International) 13 for the purpose of analysis.  58 
In the initial stages of analysis, “borrowing” concepts and codes from existing literature was 59 
used, an approach often used to help analyse data deductively (Benaquisto, 2008). Hence, the 60 
initial stages of analysis were informed by a review of existing literature documenting 61 
preparedness and flood risk protection. More, specifically, concepts associated with Protection 62 
Motivation Theory proved particularly useful in terms of sorting the data along thematic lines, 63 
(e.g. ‘self-efficacy’, ‘response-efficacy’, ‘perceived probability’, ‘perceived consequence’, 64 
‘protective response’, ‘non-protective response’ etc.) . However, other codes were also 65 
borrowed from a wider body of literature such as Kates (1962) ‘prisoner of experience’ phrase 66 
as well as the ‘levee effect’ concept (Ludy and Kondolf, 2014; Scolobig et al., 67 
                                                 
13 NVIVO-8 is a computer software programme which facilitates the analysis process by allowing the researcher 
to manage and organise large amounts of unstructured and semi-structured data. 
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2012).  Employing borrowed codes to inform our analysis proved to be valuable in terms of 68 
reflecting how our findings relate to the existing body of literature in this area.  69 
In terms of assigning data to different parts of the cognitive process, a number of criteria were 70 
established. For instance, participants had to make some reference to a particular issue which 71 
affected their ability to take protective action (or not) in order for the comment to be assigned 72 
to the ‘self-efficacy’ code (e.g. health, age, social networks etc.). Similarly, participants must 73 
have referred to the effectiveness of a specific preparedness measure in order for their 74 
comments to be assigned to the code labelled ‘response efficacy’ (e.g. flood gates, sandbags, 75 
evacuation plans etc.). Any comments which referred to the likelihood or frequency of flooding 76 
were assigned to the ‘perceived probability’, while references to the social, economic or 77 
environmental impacts of past or future flooding events were ascribed to the code of ‘perceived 78 
consequences’. In certain circumstances, it was more difficult to clearly attribute comments as 79 
belonging exclusively to one particular component of cognitive process, especially more 80 
generalised fatalistic comments which could viewed as constituting either a ‘non-protective 81 
response’ or lack of ‘self-efficacy’. In such cases, the comments were assigned to both 82 
categories for completeness and were subsequently analysed within the broader context of the 83 
results.  84 
3.0 Results 85 
3.1 Protective measures 86 
Similar to other studies, which examine communities ‘at-risk’ of flooding, our results reveal 87 
that participants generally feel underprepared for a major flooding event. Several clearly 88 
expressed that they “wouldn’t be prepared” (FG1) with others describing the relatively minor 89 
preparedness measures (e.g. checking insurance, placing valuables upstairs, putting furniture 90 
up on tables) they typically employ, and which they acknowledge are unlikely to significantly 91 
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mitigate the damages incurred by a major flood event. As outlined by some of the participants 92 
in Focus Group 1:   93 
“We didn’t make any changes to our home. At the time, knowing that they are floor 94 
board houses, there are air vents in the front, we got the sandbags, we blocked up the 95 
air vents, just to slow it down if it did get to the level of the gardens to stop it going into 96 
the floor boards. That was done while we were waiting to see if there was going to be 97 
flooding” (FG1) 98 
“The only thing we would know to do is to block off our gate...and that would stop it 99 
from getting in past the level of concrete [plinth].” (FG1) 100 
“Since 1986, we have sandbags in our garden” (FG1). 101 
When prompted with a broader range of possible preparedness measures from the moderator, 102 
there was a general lack of uptake, and indeed familiarity, with the measures raised (e.g. flood 103 
proof fixtures, community flood drills, floodgates etc.). For instance, when asked if anyone had 104 
emergency flood response kits (e.g. including torch, radio, first aid kit etc.) in their homes, one 105 
participant asked what they were and jokingly suggested that they should include a boat and a 106 
life jacket (FG2).  107 
Whilst the uptake of property-protective measures was generally low and limited to relatively 108 
minor actions, the results reveal a stronger tendency amongst the participants to adopt more 109 
self-protective measures geared towards protecting themselves and their loved ones rather than 110 
their property (e.g. evacuation plans, flood warnings etc.):  111 
“We had our car, and put it on top of the hill at [location in town], in case we needed 112 
to leave.” (FG, 1) 113 
“I remember the night we had the flood, and this guy came around and told us that 114 
there was going to be a flood. This was Hurricane Charlie… I went down to look at the 115 
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river, I will never forget it, it was raging… it was very near the top, and I immediately 116 
went back and moved my car up high [for evacuation purposes]” (Int3). 117 
 “If I heard it was coming, I would just go. Go to higher ground, ye know”. (FG1) 118 
Interestingly, some explained that they would not evacuate their homes even if an order was 119 
issued. The cited reason for this was due to security concerns- a potential barrier to evacuation 120 
that has not been reported elsewhere in the preparedness literature. To illustrate: 121 
“I wouldn't leave my home, no… security. You get out of the house, and people come 122 
in” (FG2)  123 
“You wouldn’t be two minutes out of it [the house] and it would be raided” (FG6). 124 
Despite a small number of participants outlining that they would not vacate their homes, their 125 
focus on the adoption of self-protective mitigation measures (i.e. evacuation) may reflect the 126 
flood characteristics of the catchment area, which is particularly prone to flash flooding events 127 
that have fast inundation periods and pose greater risks to life than slow rising floods. 128 
Furthermore, this finding might also be explained in part by the topographical features within 129 
the case study area where low-lying tracts of land are encased by much higher ground thus 130 
preventing water from dissipating outwards to any great degree.  131 
3.2 Non-protective measures 132 
In more extreme cases, some participants explained that they take no action at all to protect 133 
themselves against potential flooding events, otherwise known as ‘non-protective’ responses. 134 
This type of inaction can be described as the ‘ostrich effect’, otherwise known as ‘wishful 135 
thinking’/denial whereby individuals tend to neglect the realities of the situation, instead living 136 
in hope for best possible outcome: 137 
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“I haven’t thought about it, haven’t a clue, and can’t think ahead after tomorrow. If it 138 
happens, it happens”. (FG2)  139 
“I really don't think about it to be honest”. (FG3) 140 
“I have enough of worries without have to worry about something that might never 141 
happen. After the Hurricane, you were more worried about getting yourself back 142 
together. You feel disillusioned.” (FG6) 143 
For others, there was a sense of fatalism where their responses echoed feelings that nothing 144 
that can realistically be done to mitigate the damages if such an event were to reoccur: 145 
“But what can you do, what can you do to protect yourself except move out. Ye know, 146 
because it is impossible, it comes in through everything” (FG5)  147 
“Well in 2008 and 2009 [flood warnings], we never lifted anything upstairs. We said ‘that if 148 
we're going to be flooded, we are going to sit here, and let it come in and out the door…’.” 149 
(FG6) 150 
In seeking to understand what accounts for such low levels of preparedness amongst the 151 
participants, a number of interesting findings emerged which relate strongly to ideas of efficacy 152 
and one’s appraisal of flood risk. It is to these themes our attention now turns.  153 
3.3 Coping Appraisal 154 
Response efficacy 155 
A prominent theme emerging from the data which helps explain the low levels of preparedness 156 
measures adopted is the general lack of faith that participants have in terms of the range of 157 
preparedness measures available to them. In particular, many participants rubbished the idea 158 
that sandbagging is an effective way of protecting one’s home from rising floodwaters.  159 
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“We're talking about barricading our houses with sandbags, but it won’t stop it coming 160 
up the toilet downstairs, up through the sewers. Yes, our toilet downstairs overflowed.” 161 
(FG6) 162 
“Yes, even a simple issue like getting sand-bags. Our house is so old. It doesn’t have 163 
proofing, it will seep up anyway. Sandbags or no sandbags... Someone said sandbags 164 
don’t make any difference. We've had no sandbags.” (FG6) 165 
In this regard, it seems that the low level of faith in the flood-risk preparedness measures stems 166 
largely from the participants negative experiences (be them direct or indirect) of Hurricane 167 
Charlie where there was extensive damage to property from the unprecedented flood event. 168 
Other participants also demonstrated a lack of faith in other preparedness measures such as 169 
floodgates:  170 
“I thought about physical flood-gates, but if the water went three feet high, you would 171 
want something, but it can seep up through the floors…We would need a double one, 172 
we have a huge long wall....even we had flood gates on both ends; sure the wall could 173 
be knocked down with the water.” (FG6) 174 
“We bought a thing, it’s an inflatable thing you are supposed to jam it into you door. 175 
But the water came up through the sewerage” (FG2)  176 
While many of the observations raised here may be entirely warranted and substantiated based 177 
on the participants knowledge of the scale of the flood waters which occurred during Hurricane 178 
Charlie, these findings show that participants fail to acknowledge that subsequent floods may 179 
not be as aggressive as before. In doing so, they overlook the fact that there may be potential 180 
to mitigate the damages incurred by a future event through individual property protection 181 
measures which they have largely dismissed as offering a “false sense of security” (FG6).  182 
Self efficacy 183 
29 
 
In addition to the participants’ low level of faith in the preparedness measures available to 184 
them, the results reveal a low sense of self-efficacy amongst some respondents in terms of their 185 
own ability to effectively implement mitigation responses based on other variables such as age, 186 
health, etc. In particular, several participants highlighted that individuals may have a low sense 187 
of efficacy due to the physical demands that are often involved. Several of the older participants 188 
articulated this issue clearly: 189 
“We were so much better able to cope back then, we were younger. I think if it happened 190 
now, I would just throw myself into it. I just couldn’t cope with it, couldn’t cope with it 191 
[shuddering voice]. It took a lot of physical energy, we had to move out, and let them 192 
in to do the walls. And if we are carrying things upstairs on the night of the flood. All 193 
that physical energy that I had loads off back then, that I wouldn’t have now. I just feel, 194 
I just couldn’t cope with it”. (FG5) 195 
“You know, moving furniture. I have arthritis, and he is not well either” (FG6). 196 
“They [sand bags] can be heavy on elderly people, or if you live on your own. I am on 197 
my own, and to move them or anything, we really need something concise [in terms of 198 
planning]” (FG6) 199 
In a similar vein, several participants communicated the practical considerations, which are 200 
often overlooked, and which limit an individual’s capacity to implement some of the most basic 201 
flood-risk preparedness measures such as sandbagging or moving valuable items upstairs:  202 
“They [local authority] put a pile of sandbags up at the entrance into the estate, but you 203 
had to go and collect them yourself if you wanted them. That was 2011, but nobody did. 204 
But that was their idea of protection…So you can imagine if you were a 90 year old, 205 
you would hardly go up and get a sand-bag” (FG5) 206 
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 “It was it was code red [flood-risk warning].... but unlike you [another participant], I 207 
would worry. I do keep an eye on the rain. I basically live on my own, and I can't lift 208 
this and I can't lift that. What do I decide to move upstairs? The animals being the main 209 
thing” (FG6)  210 
Similar concerns were echoed by participants in Focus Group 3;  211 
“I went up to the council and I filled up my own. You had the sand and you had the bags 212 
but you had to fill them yourself…” 213 
“Elderly people couldn't do that.” 214 
“Wheelchair users…” 215 
“Just down the road from us is the handicapped house and they are all in 216 
wheelchairs…”  217 
In addition to these specific examples, low levels of efficacy in a more general sense were also 218 
observed amongst the respondents which in many respects could be considered akin to fatalistic 219 
comments regarding their inability to prevent the consequences of flooding events in any 220 
meaningful way. Such responses again appear to be closely rooted to their past experiences of 221 
Hurricane Charlie – an event which is etched within the memories of those who were directly 222 
or indirectly affected by it: 223 
“It can get in under your door, come in through the letter box, even lower than that. I 224 
was on the stairs, watching it come in through the letterbox. I don't think you can 225 
prevent it, you can't” (FG5). 226 
“When it started to come we looked out the front door and you could see it come over 227 
the football pitch. It was like a tide coming in. All you can do is go upstairs and let it 228 
come…” (FG6) 229 
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It is interesting to note that several participants recalled the damages previously incurred with 230 
great clarity despite the event taking place almost 30 years previously. The level of detail in 231 
the description and emotion which was offered when recalling their experiences about an event 232 
which took place so long ago is at odds with many other studies which highlight how people’s 233 
recollection of flood events fades significantly (Burn 1999). The following quotations illustrate 234 
the level of recollection amongst some participants: 235 
“Our floods came in through underneath the wall... I could hear the water flowing 236 
underneath the house. And I said, it has stopped, but [name] said, "No, it has reached 237 
floor level", and next minute I could see the carpet rising. And we said, "Okay, upstairs, 238 
turn off all the lights, upstairs... It was so frightening.” (FG1) 239 
“It was a very strange experience back in 1986, that particular year... I only had a baby 240 
in July, and this was August, so I am sitting upstairs in a room, with a baby and a 241 
Labrador, and all am worried about is the Labrador…. my neighbour, she had her baby 242 
two weeks after I had my baby. And I remember walking across the road to her mothers, 243 
with a wash-basket, and the baby was in this wash basket. And her house was 244 
completely destroyed. Everything was destroyed.” (FG1).  245 
While attempts can be made to enhance the self-efficacy of individuals by communicating the 246 
effectiveness of flood-risk preparedness measures and providing practical guidance on how to 247 
implement them, these findings demonstrate that communication alone may be insufficient. In 248 
particular, these results suggest that dedicated assistance needs to be provided to potentially 249 
vulnerable groups – such as older members of the community, or householders who may have 250 
a disability – whose low sense of self-efficacy is insurmountable though communication alone.  251 
3.4  Threat Appraisal 252 
Perceived probability 253 
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Another dominant finding emerging from the data is the disjoint between risk awareness and 254 
preparedness which is supported by the literature. Specifically, the data reveals a generally high 255 
threat appraisal of flooding amongst the participants which discredits the notion that the low 256 
levels of preparedness reported can be explained in terms of an information deficit. In particular, 257 
the participants demonstrated a strong awareness of the likelihood of another flooding event 258 
occurring in Bray and displayed a strong understanding of the natural processes and 259 
environmental triggers which signal that their immediate risk of being flooded is heightened. 260 
For instance, several made reference to the weather conditions and other environmental cues 261 
which signal an increased likelihood of a flooding occurring in the locality as the following 262 
quotations help illustrate: 263 
“…when it is lashing rain and you look out and you see the road flooded outside. You 264 
do get worried… Some of the heavier rains, you would keep an eye on the window” 265 
(FG6) 266 
“Well, it’s always a threat, when its pouring rain and you look out to see if it is going 267 
flood” (FG5) 268 
“Well it would just be a concern for me. And you know, you might walk over the bridge 269 
and the river would look very high, and the park will get soggy. That would be a 270 
worry.... you wouldn’t want to dwell too much about it”. (FG3) 271 
“I remember being down at the harbour, we were looking at the river, we would always 272 
watch the height of the river because normally it is quite low, but yeah, we were on the 273 
alert that time…. Well I didn’t get any warning, I just went down with a neighbour and 274 
we walked down and stood at the bridge near the sea, and we saw the river water rising 275 
and the tides coming it. Gosh, it was very near, it was very near.” (FG5) 276 
Perceived consequences 277 
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In addition to the perceived probability of flooding being generally high amongst participants, 278 
the data reveals a similarly high perception of the perceived consequences of flooding. In this 279 
regard, it was clear that anticipated damages arising from a future flooding event are closely 280 
connected to individuals past experiences of Hurricane Charlie, regardless of whether the 281 
damages were experienced directly or indirectly. 282 
“You don’t realise how high the water is going to be, we got sofas and chairs up, but 283 
the kitchen table was floating around. We didn’t think to empty the kitchen presses, and 284 
the eggs were floating around in a bowl of muck, you don’t think of the little things. We 285 
lost loads of photos.... It’s the silly little things that after, you ask “do you know where 286 
that’s gone’?”  (FG6) 287 
“My husband was alive then, it was very tough. You lost all your belongings- everything 288 
on floor level… The electrician came in, and he just said ‘That’s going, that’s going, 289 
that’s going’. All our stuff in the kitchen, everything at floor level, where the water 290 
came in, soaked everything in the cupboards, all that was gone, the carpets...” (FG5) 291 
“It was a different environment the next day, you knew who lived down in the whole of 292 
Little Bray, because everyone from there was wearing muddy boots cos there was silt 293 
everywhere. It was disgusting... people didn’t realise how much damage was done. It 294 
was shocking” (FG3) 295 
Such findings lend support to the contention that flood-risk awareness does not automatically 296 
translate to mitigation behaviour as the participants demonstrated a high threat appraisal on the 297 
one hand, but low preparedness levels on the other. This further undermines the approach 298 
favoured by various government agencies to develop communication strategies designed to 299 
enhance risk awareness in the hope that greater awareness will foster greater flood-risk 300 
preparedness levels.   301 
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The levee effect 302 
Despite evidence of high threat appraisals amongst participants, it is clear that the 303 
commencement of the flood relief works within the case study area is having a substantial 304 
influence on the risk perception on many of the participants. In particular, it is evident that 305 
there is a general feeling that the threat of flooding has reduced significantly since the flood 306 
relief works have commenced despite only reaching the mid-way point of construction14. 307 
Several quotations help illustrate this general observation:  308 
“We should see it [the river] as a threat, but definitely now that they are working on it, 309 
it won't be a threat, we feel that. But if they didn't do that, if they hadn't started on that, 310 
we would still be worried”.  (FG5) 311 
“Well, I look at the amount that they dredged out of the base of that river in the last 312 
couple of weeks… to take the flow off and slow it down, and all of that has to have an 313 
impact, even if it is not finished.” (FG1) 314 
“Whatever they have done, the chances of flooding are less than they could be. Because 315 
they put a culvert in, they've raised the wall”. (FG2)  316 
“I would be less and less worried, because last year, when everyone along the south 317 
east coast [was experiencing flood events], we would have been one of those pointing 318 
when that would have hit the top end of that wall, yeah.... and it may or may not come 319 
over it, and it didn’t get to the level at all. So, the work they had done in my mind... even 320 
though it has not finished has made a difference.” (FG1) 321 
                                                 
14 At the point fieldwork was undertaken. 
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“It is only in the last number of years that we have had this sort of rain, we can see it, 322 
we can see the danger, and if they weren’t working on it now, I would be getting worried, 323 
very worried.” (FG5) 324 
“It’s [risk of flooding] after getting better now with works, it will not come.” (FG1)   325 
 “I believe in these works, I really believe they are going to work.” (FG5).  326 
Although a small number of participants spoke less assuredly about the ability of the flood 327 
relief works to eliminate the risk of flooding, they were nonetheless largely optimistic about 328 
the protection it offers in its present guise:  329 
“[I am] slightly less worried [about flooding]. Before [the works], you would be always 330 
concerned when there was heavy deluge around, lasting for a day, you would certainly 331 
get concerned. You feel a bit more protected [now].” (FG2).  332 
Interestingly it seems that the influence of the flood relief works may be linked to the concept 333 
of observational learning whereby individuals perceive the works as being highly effective 334 
based on their observations of them working well in other locations:  335 
“It will make a huge difference; you see it in other parts of country. They have done 336 
reviews, down in Cork [county located in south-west Ireland], where they have built 337 
them, and there haven't been any floods since…  I am not expecting it. I am expecting 338 
that it won't happen again. Because they are working on it.” (FG5) 339 
Another participant explicitly stated how her concerns over the likelihood of future flooding 340 
events have virtually disappeared since there was an announcement that the flood relief works 341 
were going ahead (not to mention when they are actually built to completion): 342 
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“I have no worries at all now, once we were reassured that they were going to go ahead 343 
with the flood protection…I got reassurance from that… so now I wouldn’t be at all 344 
worried.”  (FG5, emphasis added) 345 
These findings highlight the influence that engineered flood defences can have in terms of how 346 
people perceive and ultimately respond to a threat. While one participant clearly articulated 347 
that the works “are highly likely to reduce the risk of flooding” (FG1), others had an 348 
overarching faith in terms of the ability of the flood relief works to virtually eliminate the risk 349 
of flooding entirely. Indeed, many considered that this risk had been eliminated at a time before 350 
the flood relief works have even reached completion. Such findings highlight the prevalence 351 
of the ‘levee effect’, but also demonstrate that this phenomenon can take effect before the 352 
engineered flood defences are built in accordance with their design specification.  353 
4.0 Discussion 354 
4.1 Pathways to flood-risk preparedness  355 
This paper sought to unearth the core factors negatively influencing flood-risk preparedness in 356 
a bid to identify how a shift towards greater levels of mitigation behaviour can be harnessed. 357 
In doing so, we relate our findings to PMT to make sense of our results and think about how a 358 
shift from non-protective to protective actions can be best realised (see Figure 4). To this end 359 
our study reveals a number of interesting findings which in some places lend support to existing 360 
empirical enquiries, e.g. our findings generally align with the direction of influence reflected 361 
in Figure 2 of Grothmann and Ruesswig (2006:105), but also offers new and fresh insights in 362 
others.  363 
Specifically, the results demonstrate that a high perception of risk is in itself insufficient to 364 
motivate people to prepare for a prospective flooding event thus corroborating with the findings 365 
of other scholars ( Miceli et al. 2008; Bubeck et al. 2012; Scolobig et al.2012; Poussin et al. 366 
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2014). Indeed, the findings reveal a generally high perception of risk amongst our participants 367 
based on their past experiences with a significant flooding event (i.e. Hurricane Charlie), but 368 
also their intimate understanding of the natural processes at play within the river catchment 369 
signalling times that they are in danger. Despite this knowledge however, it is clear that there 370 
remains an unwillingness and reluctance to engage in mitigation behaviour. Specifically, it is 371 
clear that participants tend to favour non-protective responses despite an acute awareness that 372 
they are at substantial risk of flooding and the scale of damages that would arise from such an 373 
event.  374 
In seeking to explain this disjoint between awareness and action, it is clear from our results that 375 
the concept of coping appraisal is crucially important. In particular, the findings elucidate that 376 
our participants are unwilling to take protective action based on their perceived inability to 377 
cope when confronted with a flooding event. The low level of faith amongst the participants in 378 
terms of the preparedness measures available is particularly noteworthy and appears strongly 379 
rooted in peoples’ past experiences of Hurricane Charlie where extensive material damages 380 
were caused. In this regard, the foregoing demonstrates the ‘prison of experience’ phenomenon 381 
(Kates, 1962) in action, whereby individuals correlate the expected frequency and 382 
consequences of future floods with their past experiences (see Hopkins and Warburton, 2014).  383 
As such, flood-risk communication strategies disseminated within communities with robust 384 
flood histories should be tailored to communicate the fact that future events may not replicate 385 
those of the past. In doing so, there needs to be considerable emphasis on the point that various 386 
mitigation measures can prove highly effective in the case of lower magnitude events.  387 
Moreover, our results suggest that the tendency for those who do take some form of action tend 388 
to prioritise their personal safety rather than making any significant attempt to protect their 389 
property may reflect the flood-risk characteristics at play in the case study area (i.e. flash 390 
flooding river catchment). In this regard, the results suggest that flood-risk communication 391 
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strategies need to be designed with respect to the flood characteristics of the area in question. 392 
Within the context of a flash flooding river catchment, it is apparent that individuals would 393 
benefit greatly from information about the types of preparedness measures that can be 394 
realistically implemented  in situations where there is a small lead in time thus reflecting the 395 
particular circumstances (e.g. flood depths) at play in their locality.   396 
Alongside any effort geared towards strengthening levels of response efficacy amongst 397 
individuals at risk, this study demonstrated that self-efficacy is paramount if the take up of 398 
preparedness measures is to succeed. In particular, our study lends support to others who have 399 
highlighted the need for detailed guidance to be provided to at risk communities, not only in 400 
terms of the preparedness measures available, but also through the provision of detailed 401 
information about how they are actually implemented in practice (Bubeck et al., 2013: 1327)  402 
Throughout our data, the financial costs (i.e. response costs) associated with implementing 403 
flood-risk preparedness measures did not emerge as a significant concern. However, the 404 
inability for particularly vulnerable groups to implement mitigation actions was raised as an 405 
issue by a number of participants. In this regard, out study suggests that funds which may be 406 
ring-fenced to provide financial assistance to roll out the provision of mitigation measures (e.g. 407 
flood gates) could be redirected towards providing direct assistance to people to help them 408 
implement measures which they feel they cannot do by themselves. Moreover, our findings 409 
suggest that financial incentives to stimulate the adoption of mitigation measures would be 410 
better spent strengthening levels of response and self-efficacy of households via tailored and 411 
targeted communication campaigns. This could take the form of individual household 412 
assessments to inform individuals of the specific measures available to them, and providing 413 
assistance with their implementation when required - similar to the RainReady program 414 
operated by the Center for Neighborhood Technology (CNT) in Chicago.  415 
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In addition to the need to bolster coping appraisals to stimulate a shift from non-protective to 416 
protective actions within our case study area, the results also signal the need to increase 417 
individuals’ appraisal of flood-risk in light of the current flood relief works. In particular, it is 418 
clear that the flood relief scheme which is partially constructed in Bray is negatively 419 
influencing individual’s perception of the probability of a flooding event taking place in the 420 
future now that the relief scheme is underway. Any reduction in an individual’s risk perception 421 
will undoubtedly influence the take-up of preparedness measures in a negative way. Although 422 
we acknowledge that our focus group participants were generally underprepared before the 423 
works ever commenced, the findings suggest that the few who do currently seek prepare to 424 
protect themselves and their families against prospective floods (most notably through 425 
evacuation planning) will become more vulnerable as they begin to consider themselves fully 426 
protected as the flood relief scheme reaches completion.  427 
While various authors have argued that flood-risk communication strategies need to more 428 
specific in explaining that “no structural protection measure is infallible” (Scolobig et al., 429 
2012: 515) this study goes further by demonstrating that communication of residual risk should 430 
not only take place once engineered defences are put in place, rather there is a need for such 431 
communication to take place at various stages throughout the entire programme of works. This 432 
is admittedly not going to be easy as such an admission would undoubtedly create problems 433 
for those responsible for delivering structural components of flood-risk management 434 
programmes, particularly in terms of generating stakeholder ‘buy in’ during the design and 435 
consultation stages, which can often be hotly contested.  436 
Figure 4: Application of results to the PMT Framework 437 
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 438 
4.2 Limitations 439 
PROTECTIVE 
RESPONSE  
Amongst the small numbers 
who adopt protective actions, 
measures geared towards 
‘self-protection’ (i.e. 
evacuation) over property 
protection. Rooted in lack of 
response efficacy & self-
efficacy.  
NON-PROTECTIVE 
RESPONSE 
Results reflect the prevalence 
of non-protective responses. 
The potential for protection 
motivation is reduced by a 
low sense of coping appraisal 
informed by prior 
experiences of a major 
flooding event in 1986.  
While participants are aware 
of the threat of flooding, faith 
in the effectiveness of the 
flood relief schemes appears 
to be lowering their threat 
appraisals.  
Interventions are required at 
“Source of Information” to 
re-align the cognitive 
mediating processes that 
motivate protective actions to 
be taken.   
 
 
  
Verbal persuasion 
N/A 
 
Observational learning 
Faith in flood relief  
works rooted in 
observation of  their 
success elsewhere 
 
Personality variables: 
For some, age, health and 
living status can impact 
negatively on their 
perceived ability to cope.  
Prior experience: The 
experience of Hurricane 
Charlie impacts negatively 
on an individual’s belief in 
the effectiveness of flood 
protection measures, and 
their sense of self-efficacy 
in responding to flood risk.  
THREAT APPRAISAL 
Perceived probability: High threat 
appraisal based on experiences, but the 
modifying effect of structural flood 
defences means that participants 
believe that current and future risk of 
flooding is reduced because of 
protection offered by the flood 
defences. 
Perceived consequence: Awareness 
shown of the consequences of flooding 
based on experiences of, and stories 
about Hurricane Charlie.  
COPING APPRAISAL 
Perceived self-efficacy: Low 
self-efficacy reflected through 
feelings of helplessness, and 
variables such as age and 
health.  
Perceived response efficacy: 
Low sense of belief in the 
effectiveness of flood 
protection measures based on 
previous experiences 
Perceived response costs: 
Little emphasis on the costs 
(financial, time, effort) as a 
barrier to protective action  
SOURCE OF INFORMATION  COGNITIVE MEDIATING PROCESS COPING RESPONSE 
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The authors acknowledge the small sample size of participants. Ideally, focus groups should 440 
comprise between four and twelve participants (Kitzinger, 1995; Carlsen and Glenton, 2011). 441 
While every effort was made to help ensure ease of participation (i.e. the provision of sufficient 442 
information on the research objectives and participation, the provision of compensation for 443 
participation, and the time and location of the focus groups), a number of planned focus groups 444 
did not yield the required numbers. In one instance, the focus group was instead categorised as 445 
a semi-structured interview. This demonstrates the difficulty in terms of terms of engaging 446 
people in research in relation to hazard events such as flooding, specifically those who do not 447 
have any prior flood experience. The difficulties encountered in this regard may reflect the fact 448 
that various other channels of communication have been available to residents within the case 449 
study area over the past number of years as part of the overall programme of works running in 450 
parallel with the flood relief scheme (e.g. public consultation, access to liaison officers/ 451 
engineers etc.). The various outlets available amongst those within the flood zone to voice their 452 
concerns may have reduced the appeal of the focus groups sessions. Indeed, the low levels of 453 
turnout may reflect a case of ‘stakeholder burnout’ (Fainstein, 2000) whereby those typically 454 
interested and engaged in flooding issues no longer wish to engage in any further discussion 455 
surrounding the topic.  456 
Secondly, the authors acknowledge that the composition and outcomes of this exploratory, 457 
small-scale study may not necessarily mirror the views and experiences of the overall 458 
population. Given the significance of flood experience, particularly from 1986, it is possible to 459 
suggest that those affected directly or indirectly by flooding were more likely to participate in 460 
the research. Although this argument may explain the absence of participants from Focus 461 
Group 4, the significance of experience in explaining interest in the research may introduce an 462 
element of bias into the results. Recruitment drives in any future research activity needs to be 463 
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cognisant of the need to target those who may not have direct or indirect experiences of 464 
flooding 465 
4.3 Conclusion 466 
Overall, this paper demonstrates that there is a pressing need for a shift away from an 467 
information deficit model to redress the disjoint between the changing direction of flood-risk 468 
management policy and the lack of individual preparedness often observed in practice. This 469 
study offers fresh insights in this regard by offering detailed qualitative data to explore how 470 
pathways to enhanced flood-risk preparedness can be opened up. In doing so, it presents a 471 
number of interesting findings which have not been elucidated by existing enquiries which 472 
have a predominantly quantitative focus. In particular our research reveals that engineered 473 
flood defences can have a substantial influence on flood-risk perception during the construction 474 
phase thus highlighting that the levee effect can take hold before a relief scheme is fully 475 
implemented. In this regard, this paper adds to the socio-hydrology literature by offering a 476 
greater understanding of the social processes leading to misperception of risk in response to 477 
hydrological changes that are arising from construction works; thereby capturing some of the 478 
“feedbacks between physical and social processes” as discussed by  Di Baldassarre et al. (2015: 479 
4770). Moreover, the paper demonstrates the inherent value of coping appraisal as a cognitive 480 
process, which can be targeted to help ensure that individuals with high perceptions of risk are 481 
prompted to take action to reduce their exposure to the risk of flooding. Bubeck et al. 482 
(2013:1327) previously noted that “empirical literature on coping appraisals is still scarce”.  483 
This paper contributes to addressing that gap and our qualitative findings support the contention 484 
that coping appraisal as a variable accounting for flood-risk protection is one which is worthy 485 
of more investigation.  486 
 487 
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